Difference between revisions of "Simulation theory"

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The philosopher Nick Bostrom (University of Oxford) explored, with rigor, the issue of the simulation argument, for the first time, in a 2003 article. The type of simulations he explored are not akin to the ones in the movie Matrix, for example. In the film, the world was simulated but the conscious minds were not. On the contrary, the simulations explored by Bostrom do not have a biological component, being run on a deeper level hardware or in virtual machines inside other simulations. The argument takes into account the assumption of substrate-independence and the technological limits of computation, and a bland indifference principle <ref name=”1”></ref> <ref name=”4”></ref>.
 
The philosopher Nick Bostrom (University of Oxford) explored, with rigor, the issue of the simulation argument, for the first time, in a 2003 article. The type of simulations he explored are not akin to the ones in the movie Matrix, for example. In the film, the world was simulated but the conscious minds were not. On the contrary, the simulations explored by Bostrom do not have a biological component, being run on a deeper level hardware or in virtual machines inside other simulations. The argument takes into account the assumption of substrate-independence and the technological limits of computation, and a bland indifference principle <ref name=”1”></ref> <ref name=”4”></ref>.
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===Assumption of substrate-independence===
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Substrate-independence is a common assumption in the philosophy of mind studies. It asserts that human consciousness is not dependent on a biological substrate. It could, theoretically, be replicated in silicon-based processors, provided the system has the right sort of computational structures and processes, with fine-grained detail like on the level of the individual synapses. The replication would not, necessarily, have to be perfect; just good enough that a human-like subjective experience could be generated. This assumption, although not universally, is widely accepted <ref name=”1”></ref> <ref name=”4”></ref> <ref name=”6”> Bostrom, N. (2003). The simulation argument: why the probability that you are living in a matrix is quite high. Retrieved from http://simulation-argument.com/matrix.html</ref>.
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Currently, there is not enough computer power to run the computational processes required to replicate the human brain for the emergence of consciousness. Even if they were available, there is still a lack of knowledge in how to program such a thing. Besides this, there would also need to be sophisticated ways of making a very detailed scan of a human brain. These are only technical difficulties, and not physical law or material constrains. A sufficiently advanced civilization with enough computer power to create conscious minds in computer hardware would be classifies as posthuman <ref name=”4”></ref> <ref name=”6”></ref>.
  
 
==References==
 
==References==

Revision as of 18:19, 18 January 2017

A number of different writers, technologists, and futurologists have predicted that the available computer power in the future will be enormous. Future civilizations may have the capability to create simulations with a high level of detail. These would simulate the universe and its laws, allowing for the emergence of self-conscious entities that could communicate with one another. They could be simulations of that civilization's forebears, and since they would run on very powerful computers, they could run a great many of them [1] [2]. The idea that our universe is a software process running on some deeper computational substrate is known as the Simulation Argument (or Simulation Hypothesis). Nick Bostrom has provided an argument for this thesis, and while other philosophers are taking this idea seriously, physicist suggest that there might be practical ways to find evidence that confirms it [3] [4] [5].

Simulation argument

The philosopher Nick Bostrom (University of Oxford) explored, with rigor, the issue of the simulation argument, for the first time, in a 2003 article. The type of simulations he explored are not akin to the ones in the movie Matrix, for example. In the film, the world was simulated but the conscious minds were not. On the contrary, the simulations explored by Bostrom do not have a biological component, being run on a deeper level hardware or in virtual machines inside other simulations. The argument takes into account the assumption of substrate-independence and the technological limits of computation, and a bland indifference principle [1] [4].

Assumption of substrate-independence

Substrate-independence is a common assumption in the philosophy of mind studies. It asserts that human consciousness is not dependent on a biological substrate. It could, theoretically, be replicated in silicon-based processors, provided the system has the right sort of computational structures and processes, with fine-grained detail like on the level of the individual synapses. The replication would not, necessarily, have to be perfect; just good enough that a human-like subjective experience could be generated. This assumption, although not universally, is widely accepted [1] [4] [6].

Currently, there is not enough computer power to run the computational processes required to replicate the human brain for the emergence of consciousness. Even if they were available, there is still a lack of knowledge in how to program such a thing. Besides this, there would also need to be sophisticated ways of making a very detailed scan of a human brain. These are only technical difficulties, and not physical law or material constrains. A sufficiently advanced civilization with enough computer power to create conscious minds in computer hardware would be classifies as posthuman [4] [6].

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 Bostrom, N. (2003). Are you living in a computer simulation? Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211): 243-255
  2. Barrow, J. D. (2007). Living in a simulated universe. In Universe or Multiverse? Cambridge University Press, pp. 481-486
  3. Steinhart, E. (2010). Theological Implications of the Simulation Argument. Ars Disputandi, 10(1): 23-37
  4. 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Jones, A. Z. (2015). Are we living in a computer simulation? Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/blogs/physics/2015/07/are-we-living-in-a-computer-simulation/
  5. Beane, S. R., Davoudi, Z. and Savage, M. J. (2012). Constraints on the universe as a numerical simulation. arXiv:1210.1847v2 [hep-ph]
  6. 6.0 6.1 Bostrom, N. (2003). The simulation argument: why the probability that you are living in a matrix is quite high. Retrieved from http://simulation-argument.com/matrix.html